In reporting published on November 23, 2026, Python Software Foundation security developers Seth Larson and Mike Fiedler described how certain GitHub Actions triggers can let outsiders start workflows with access to repository credentials. They documented policies for restricting the triggers and applied them to GitHub organizations stewarded by the foundation: psf, python and pypi.
The distinction matters for pull requests from forks. According to the developers, a workflow using pull_request runs contributed code with a read-only token and no secrets. The similar-looking pull_request_target trigger can run with a read/write token and access to repository and organization secrets. It is intended for tasks such as labeling a pull request without running the contributor’s code. If a workflow instead checks out and runs that code, an outsider who opens a pull request could execute it with the workflow’s credentials.
They also warned about issue_comment workflows, which can be started by a comment on an issue or pull request. Risk arises when a workflow runs untrusted code or inserts comment text into a shell command. Their documentation advises organizations on GitHub Team or Enterprise plans to assess and then enforce an organization-wide policy; users on a Free plan can apply a policy repository by repository.



